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Abstract 
Heroes are not born; they’re made. This article examines the commonalities in the 
backgrounds of people who take heroic action on behalf of others to theorize the 
ways in which our society can encourage citizens to prepare themselves to act he-
roically. In looking closely at a variety of people who have acted heroically, in a sin-
gle moment or over time, we argue they have at least four crucial commonalities: 
They imagined situations where help was needed and considered how they would 
act; they had an expansive sense of empathy, not simply with those who might be 
considered “like them” but also those who might be thought of as “other” in some 
decisive respect; they regularly took action to help people, often in small ways; and 
they had some experience or skill that made them confident about undertaking the 
heroic action in question. 
Keywords: hero, heroism, empathy, altruism, heroic imagination, development  
Every year in New York City, dozens of people die after falling from sub-
way platforms and being struck by oncoming trains. Indeed, in 2013, 151 
commuters were hit by trains (Donohue, 2013). On nearly every occasion, 
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dozens of people stood by, each of whom likely would have said before-
hand that they would definitely step up to help someone in desperate need 
of assistance. Most people like to think of themselves as helpers. Ask any-
one about a commuter falling on the tracks, a drowning child, or a woman 
whose purse has been snatched, and the certainty of heroic action is virtu-
ally assured.1 As such, if asked, these subway commuters might have said 
they could see themselves doing something heroic in this situation: calling 
911, organizing a rescue effort that involves the group of onlookers, provid-
ing some sort of medical assistance after the fallen man has been hauled 
back onto the platform, or even jumping down to lift the man up onto the 
platform before the train arrives. But, importantly, they were not asked and, 
at least in part, we contend that is one reason they mostly do not take ac-
tion. While we undoubtedly want to think of ourselves as the sort of people 
who would rush to assist someone in need, it is far more likely that most of 
us would be among the throng that is standing by, watching the events un-
fold. Indeed, studies of the failure to act in situations of precisely this sort 
have grown in number, with the result that the Bystander Effect, or diffu-
sion of responsibility is a fairly well established principle in the field of psy-
chology (see, e.g., Darley & Latane, 1968; Fischer et al., 2011). 
And yet, every year, there are also reports of subway heroes. They step 
out of the crowd and attempt to assist the person who has stumbled and 
fallen into harm’s way; they do what we all take to be the right thing, de-
spite the obvious risk. Society tends to briefly lionize these heroes without 
learning much about them. Most of them simply walk away after their he-
roics, uninterested in any media coverage or reward, and most of them are 
never heard from again after taking heroic action. 
It turns out to be very difficult for most people to do the right thing when 
the stakes are high. This is not to say that people are uncertain about what 
it would mean to do the right thing in any given situation. The real reason 
that most people are bystanders rather than heroes is that most people are 
out of practice. 
Clear, commonly used, and relatively well-studied examples of heroism 
are the so-called Righteous Gentiles of the Holocaust, rescuers who risked 
life and social standing to help Jews evade or escape from the Nazi machin-
ery of death. The risk undertaken by these individuals was extreme and of-
ten required them to consciously choose to put themselves and their fami-
lies in danger over and over again, often for a period of several years. But 
heroic action can also be a one-time decision, undertaken seemingly with-
out a great deal of planning or decision-making time, as the case of the sub-
way rescuer or the civilian who rescues another person from a fire aptly 
demonstrated. And while heroism is often associated in the popular imagi-
nation with physical risk, we also posit that the whistle-blowing employee 
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who reveals unethical or illegal activities in their workplace—risking their 
job, income, and social standing—is a hero (Franco, Blau, & Zimbardo, 2011; 
Franco & Zimbardo, 2006; Zimbardo, 2007). Although anyone can be a hero, 
individuals who take heroic action are rare (Franco & Zimbardo, 2006). Al-
though heroes are rare, they exemplify human excellence and deserve em-
pirical attention to understand their development. 
Humanistic psychology focuses on the breadth and depth of all human 
experience to understand humans themselves (Schneider, Pierson, & Bu-
gental, 2014); and we are particularly interested in the experience of hu-
manities heroes. This article begins to examine the ways in which people 
who act heroically are primed to take that action as a result of their per-
sonal history. In looking closely at a variety of people who have acted he-
roically, in a single moment or over time, we argue they have at least four 
crucial commonalities: They imagined situations where help was needed 
and considered how they would act; they had an expansive sense of empa-
thy, not simply with those who might be considered “like them” but also 
those who might be thought of as “other” in some decisive respect; they reg-
ularly took action to help people, often in small ways; and they had some 
experience or skill that made them confident about undertaking the heroic 
action in question. 
Heroes are valued across cultures and throughout history (Becker & Ea-
gly, 2004; Kohen, 2014). Suppositions about heroes and other exemplars’ 
motivation, responsibility, love, and choice have been primary concerns of 
humanists and psychologists since the days of Socrates and Plato (Schneider 
et al., 2014). Yet surprisingly, little research focuses on understanding the 
development of heroes. Although the literature is sparse, there are studies 
comparing the traits of heroes to more typical individuals, and investigat-
ing laypersons’ views of heroes (Franco et al., 2011; Midlarsky, Fagin Jones, 
& Corley, 2005). There is also a growing understanding that not all heroes 
are the same (Kohen, 2014; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). We define a 
hero as a person who knowingly, and voluntarily, acts for the good of one 
or more people at significant risk to the self, without being motivated by 
reward (Zimbardo, 2007). Risk to the hero makes heroism a distinct form 
of altruism (Franco et al., 2011). 
Expansive Empathy 
For Richard Rorty (1989, p. 191), solidarity and sympathy are directly re-
sultant from personal identifications. When those who are suffering “are 
thought of as ‘one of us,’ where ‘us’ means something smaller and more 
local than the human race,” the sense of solidarity with them is strongest. 
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Indeed, he suggests that human rights promotion is best served by “[con-
centrating] our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental ed-
ucation. That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently 
well acquainted with one another that they are less tempted to think of 
those different from themselves as only quasi-human” (Rorty, 1998, p. 
176). Pushing the example of the Holocaust further, Rorty (1989, p. 190-
191) notes: 
Did they [non-Jewish Danes and Italians] say, about their Jewish neigh-
bors, that they deserved to be saved because they were fellow human 
beings? Perhaps sometimes they did, but surely they would usually, if 
queried, have used more parochial terms to explain why they were tak-
ing risks to protect a given Jew— for example, that this particular Jew 
was a fellow Milanese, or a fellow Jutlander, or a fellow member of the 
same union or profession, or a fellow bocce player, or a fellow parent 
of small children. 
Rorty insists that victims of persecution, rather than making an appeal 
to our common humanity, have traditionally been better served by appeal-
ing to a more powerful, more immediate, commonality. 
In agreement with Rorty on this point is William F. Schulz, former Ex-
ecutive Director of Amnesty International USA, whose argument lines up 
very closely with Rorty’s. After detailing human rights abuses in Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, and El Salvador, he notes, 
I am stricken at heart because I have the imagination to know at least 
in proximate form what the experience, the pain, must have felt like. I 
am stricken at heart because on some level I identify with the victims; 
I know what it is to bleed. Although I have never been bitten by a horde 
of red ants or had a thumb amputated or been crushed by a wall, I have 
enough acquaintance with human suffering, either my own or that of 
those I love, that my memory of that acquaintance stokes my recogni-
tion (Schulz, 2002, p. 23). 
Not everyone, however, finds Rorty’s hypothesis compelling. Norman 
Geras (1995, p. 11) is surprised by 
how abstract . . . how obviously speculative, Rorty’s thesis about the 
rescuers is. “Perhaps,” he suggests, they occasionally said something 
like this; but “surely” they more often said something like that. These 
rescuers were real people and there is a body of writing about them. 
In a sense, though, Geras misses Rorty’s ultimate point. Rorty’s goal is not 
necessarily to create more rescuers but to instead expand everyone’s sense 
of solidarity in order to prevent the human rights violations that require 
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heroic behavior. This is what Rorty (1998, p. 181), following Annette Baier, 
refers to as a “progress of sentiments.” 
How has this progress of sentiments occurred and what might we do 
to extend its reach? On this point, Rorty (1989, p. 196) offers us a great 
deal, both in terms of his own theory and also in terms of our research on 
heroism: 
The right way to take the slogan “We have obligations to human beings 
simply as such” is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to 
expand our sense of ‘us’ as far as we can. That slogan urges us to ex-
trapolate further in the direction set by certain events in the past—the 
inclusion among “us” of the family in the next cave, then of the tribe 
across the river, then of the tribal confederation beyond the mountains, 
then of the unbelievers beyond the seas (and, perhaps last of all, of the 
menials who, all this time, have been doing our dirty work). This is a 
process which we should try to keep going. We should stay on the look-
out for marginalized people—people who we still instinctively think of 
as “they” rather than “us.” We should try to notice our similarities with 
them. The right way to construe the slogan is as urging us to create a 
more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently have. 
Most important to note is Rorty’s (1998) notion that our sense of who 
“we” are can be continually expanded to include more and more people 
based on similarities that are not found so much as they are created by 
telling 
the sort of long, sad, sentimental story that begins, “Because this is what 
it is like to be in her situation—to be far from home, among strangers,” 
or “Because she might become your daughter-in-law,” or “Because her 
mother would grieve for her.” (p. 185) 
Telling these sorts of stories, he argues, is the most practical method for 
increasing our sense of solidarity with those we once considered “others.” 
By way of example, consider the case of Carl Wilkens, an Adventist 
missionary and the only American to remain in Rwanda during the 1994 
genocide. When the genocide began, the U.S. government closed its em-
bassy in Kigali and evacuated citizens who were residing all across the 
country. Wilkens, however, made the decision to send his family home 
and to remain in Rwanda (see Barker, 2004). In doing so, he put himself 
directly in harm’s way, not only because of the ongoing warfare between 
the Hutu Power government and Tutsi-led rebels but because he sheltered 
Tutsi refugees from the interahamwe militia and worked to assist others 
who were in hiding. When asked why he chose to act as he did, Wilkens’s 
response is telling: 
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For a while, when people would ask me why [I] chose to stay, I would 
try to go into some detail [about] that Tutsi young lady and that Tutsi 
young man [who worked for me]. [They] were [the] faces [of the vic-
tims of the genocide], representing the country and I felt if I left, they 
were going to be killed. . . . The first three weeks, I never left my house, 
and I was wondering, why did I stay? What am I doing? [Then I real-
ized] the two people in my house [were] still alive, and I [was] very 
grateful for that. (Barker, 2004) 
That his heroic rescue of Tutsi began with those who were closest to 
him is no surprise, but what is noteworthy is that he need not have iden-
tified with them in the way that he did, given that so many others (Hutus, 
Americans, other foreign nationals in Rwanda and abroad) did not. Doing 
so, recognizing that these potential victims were like him in some impor-
tant respect, allowed him to expand the circle of care that is so important 
to heroic behavior (Kohen, 2010). 
Empathy has always been highly correlated with heroic and altruistic 
actors (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007; Harvey, Erdos, & Turnbull, 2009; 
Jayawickreme & Di Stefano, 2012; Midlarsky et al., 2005; Osswald, Greit-
emeyer, Fischer, & Frey, 2004, 2010). And while some researchers such as 
Oliner and Oliner (1989) conclude that heroes act because of an expanded 
sense of empathy, other psychological research on empathy and proso-
cial behavior seems to support Rorty’s point. Empathy is an affective re-
sponse that comes from taking the perspective of another while sharing 
the same or similar emotions. The emotional component develops incred-
ibly early in children, essentially from birth (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Spinrad, 
2006), then as children’s cognitive abilities advance they gain perspec-
tive taking skills and are able to empathize to stories, by mid childhood 
they can empathize with another person’s specific struggles, and adoles-
cents are able to both feel and take the perspectives of entire groups, such 
as the poor (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Interestingly, recent research on the 
neural circuitry of empathy suggests that empathy for similar others “is 
neutrally distinct from empathy for humankind, more generally (Mathur, 
Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010, p. 1474).” The affective response is experi-
enced broadly in response to any suffering other, but the cognitive com-
ponent of empathy, perspective taking, may be activated only when ob-
serving the suffering of similar others (Mathur et al., 2010). Additionally, 
Mathur et al. (2010) determined the cognitive process, not affective, must 
be in place for altruistic motivation. 
Clearly, the ability to take the perspective of others is directly tied to 
Rorty’s argument. Furthermore, many programs seeking to foster empathy 
seem to operate on the assumption that it is easier to take the perspective of 
someone similar to you, than more dissimilar (Belman & Flanagan, 2010). 
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One of the most common ways to foster empathy is to encourage a partici-
pant to take the perspective of a similar, rather than dissimilar, other. This 
is used often to foster empathy in medical professionals, for conflict res-
olution, and in school antibullying programs (Belman & Flanagan, 2010). 
These programs have varying levels of success but one clear example is an 
empathy focused method of rape prevention given to male student athletes 
and fraternity members where they watched a video describing the rape of 
a man, by two other men (Foubert & Perry, 2007). Participants made clear 
connections between the feelings they had while watching it, and the feel-
ings a woman would have in similar situations (Foubert & Perry, 2007). 
While the act of refraining from rape is clearly not heroic, this example 
demonstrates that it was easier to take the perspective of similar others, 
than more dissimilar others. In short, empathy was easier when the partici-
pants saw immediate commonalities with the victims; this pattern has been 
seen in heroes as well. When comparing rescuers during the Holocaust to 
bystanders, Fagin-Jones and Midlarsky (2007) found evidence that heroes 
who had experienced persecution themselves were more likely to help be-
cause they were more likely to empathize with the victims. However, they 
also found that bystanders had more previous experience with Jews than 
the heroic rescuers (Fagin-Jones & Midlarsky, 2007). 
Another rationale for how this expanded empathy arises comes from the 
self-expansion model of motivation. Aron, Norman, and Aron (1998) de-
scribe that as people develop relationships, their self expands and begins 
to include the other. A clear example of this is a partner in a relationship 
who takes on the perspectives of their companion. In essence their self has 
expanded and the other is now included as an overlapping part of the self. 
However, this process does not need to involve a close relationship, it can 
involve strangers. Specifically, the cognitive component of empathy involves 
a person putting themselves in the shoes of the other, this acts as a means 
of including the other in the self (Aron et al., 1998). Aron argues that when 
a person sees someone in need, empathy is activated and the process of tak-
ing that person’s perspective makes them more self-like, expanding the self 
to include that other (Aron et al., 1998). Furthermore, this inclusion of an-
other person in the self enhances empathy and altruism (Aron et al., 2004). 
The conclusion is that while it’s likely not all heroes acted out of empa-
thy born of direct commonality, many likely did, and in any case it is clear 
that working to see “others” as similar to “us” is one effective way to de-
velop empathy. We hypothesize that most heroes expanded their empathy 
to include the people they helped; additionally, we predict that working to 
expand empathy could be an effective way to increase prosocial and even 
heroic behavior.  
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Heroic Imagination 
In addition, and very much related to this expansive sense of empathy, 
is the development of what we call the heroic imagination, by which we 
mean that, prior to their heroic actions, heroes imagined situations where 
help was needed and considered how they would act. This has been a pri-
mary focus of Zeno Franco and Phil Zimbardo since the writing of their 
first article in Greater Good (2006) and in The Lucifer Effect (2007). They 
proposed an intervention where they would foster the “heroic imagina-
tion, or the development of a personal heroic ideal. This heroic ideal can 
help guide a person’s behavior is times of trouble or moral uncertainty” 
(Franco & Zimbardo, 2006, p. 31). While there is currently a dearth of 
empirical evidence in support of these interventions, there are dramatic 
anecdotal examples of participants who attended the Hero Round Table, 
or participated in the Heroic Imagination Project interventions, who did 
find themselves in situations requiring heroism and acted heroically (Hero 
Round Table, 2016). 
Christopher Norman provides a noteworthy example. He was a passen-
ger on a high speed train from Amsterdam to Paris at the end of August in 
2015. A heavily armed man came into his cabin with the clear intent to cause 
harm. Norman’s first reaction was to hide. He ducked to the floor and hoped 
he would survive. His reaction turned into considered action as he decided 
he needed to do something rather than remaining passive and almost cer-
tainly dying. As a regular traveler, Norman had thought about this kind of 
situation before. He had played out scenarios in his head, considering his 
possible actions. He had also talked about these possibilities before. A cou-
ple of weeks before the incident on the train, he had spoken to a friend in 
law enforcement about his options. His conclusion was that action was the 
only option. It is no surprise that he took action on the day of the attack. 
Two years after, Wesley Autrey famously saved a man’s life by laying on 
top of him between the subway tracks, Chad Lindsey found himself unex-
pectedly recalling the story. Lindsey was on the platform waiting for his 
train, when a man fell onto the tracks. He leapt onto the tracks and tried to 
lift the unconscious, bleeding man onto the platform. He had difficulty doing 
so and saw the tunnel starting to get lighter. Recalling Autrey’s feat, Lindsey 
decided not to repeat it. He told The New York Times (Wilson, 2009), “I was 
like, ‘I am not doing that. We’ve got to get out of here.’” He called for help 
and bystanders turned into active helpers, pulling the man onto the tracks. 
In an e-mail to the authors Lindsey said, “I don’t think I had consciously 
absorbed Autrey’s lessons for ACTUAL USE . . . but when I was confronted 
with the situation, it seems I had instant access to those memories—what 
to do, where to lie in the track-bed had it come to that, how horrendous it 
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would be for the rolling stock to pass over you.” He also pointed out that as 
a Michigander living in New York he had “curiosity about the transit sys-
tem in general led me to have a fuller knowledge of the moving parts even 
before I ever imagined I’d need them” (C. Lindsey, personal communica-
tion, March 21, 2016). 
There are also examples of heroes in the literature like Oscar Romero 
and Andree de Jongh. Romero was an Archbishop who was assassinated for 
sermons and activism in support, defense, and liberation of the poor in San 
Salvador (Brockman, 1989; Bronk & Riches, 2016). He clearly considered 
how he would act in times of trouble or moral uncertainty because he be-
came more active after his mentor Rutilio Grande was assassinated for the 
same thing (Brockman, 1989; Bronk & Riches, 2016). While growing up in 
Belgium, Andree de Jongh, wanted to be like her hero, Edith Cavell. Cavell 
had been executed for helping captured British soldiers escape captivity dur-
ing World War I. De Jongh followed in Cavell’s footsteps, becoming a nurse 
before World War II. When the war started, she signed up to volunteer for 
the Red Cross. Within a year, De Jongh had set up the Comet Line; a se-
ries of safe houses and escape routes from Brussels to Bilbao, Spain. Both 
Romero and De Jongh are also great examples of the habitual helper, as dis-
cussed below. There are a great many of these stories, but it is also clear 
that there is not as much research on the heroic imagination as there is on 
empathy in heroes. Even so, there are empirical connections we can make. 
Mental practice, or imagining, has been successfully used in sports psy-
chology to improve specific skills, and in counseling situations to practice 
interpersonal interactions (Cooper, Tindall-Ford, Chandler, & Sweller, 2001; 
Kendall, Hrycaiko, Martin, & Kendall, 1990). Even when a specific skill is not 
practiced explicitly imagery rehearsal, or imagining, is effective at improv-
ing specific sports skills (Kendall et al., 1990), which is relevant to the he-
roic imagination because it may be impossible or unwise to explicitly prac-
tice many heroism scenarios. Cooper et al. (2001) also found that imagining 
is an effective way to improve performance for someone who has experi-
ence with a subject or context, but imagining is not effective for a novice 
who has little or no experience with that subject or context. The effect is 
even more pronounced when self-talk or self-explanation is included along 
with imagining (Cooper et al., 2001). This is directly related to the special 
training and experience of many heroes we discuss in more detail below. 
Imagining acting heroically in contexts and with skills familiar to a person 
will be more effective than imagining a heroic act in contexts the subject 
has no knowledge of. 
The heroic imagination may also be related to prospection. Prospection 
is the process of mentally running through hypothetical future situations, 
evaluating prospective behaviors, and selecting an action based on needs 
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and goals (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2013). One example of 
prospection that most people are familiar with is imagining a difficult con-
versation with a friend, a person might predict the responses their friend 
could give, and prepare rebuttals for potential responses (Seligman et al., 
2013). While much of prospection happens automatically and implicitly, it 
can be performed deliberately, and the deliberate practice of imagining one-
self in heroic situations may serve as a form of prospection. Prospection 
helps drive goals and motivate behavior (Seligman et al., 2013), and may 
also help a person clarify their self-concept, in this way engaging the heroic 
imagination may help a person see themselves as a potential hero. We also 
predict that this heroic imagination will be more effective when the imag-
ined contexts are familiar, in a similar area as the special training the pro-
spective hero has special training in. We encourage more work on the he-
roic imaginations affect the development of heroes. 
Special Training 
Very much related to the idea of imagining oneself taking heroic action is 
the notion of developing a skill that is ultimately translatable to heroic ac-
tion. In other words, it is all well and good to consider how I might respond 
to an emergency, but it is also obviously beneficial to actually possess some 
experience or skill that makes me confident about undertaking the heroic 
action in question. The problem of the rescuing the hypothetical drowning 
child is a familiar one to most people and Peter Singer (1972) sums up the 
ethical requirements of a passerby succinctly: “if it is in our power to pre-
vent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing any-
thing morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (p. 231).2 But a re-
quirement for acting on behalf of the drowning child, most people believe, 
is some baseline ability to swim. It would be heroic for anyone to attempt 
to rescue a drowning child, but the chances of success are obviously much 
greater for someone with lifeguard training. We want to go a step farther 
and argue that it is more likely for someone who regards herself as a strong 
swimmer to attempt a rescue than it would be for someone who does not 
know how to swim; the former, even without lifeguard training, is more 
likely to jump into the water while the latter would be more likely to re-
main a bystander (and advisedly so).3 
Three Americans were also involved in effort with Christopher Norman 
to prevent a massacre on the train in Europe. Anthony Sadler, Spencer 
Stone, and Alek Skarlatos ran at the man with very little hesitation and took 
much of the credit in stopping the attack. Each of them had military train-
ing. While this training is unlikely to have specifically prepared them to 
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take down an armed man on a train, they undoubtedly had practiced com-
bat during training and perhaps had engaged in combat during their service. 
In 2015, a member of Parkour Generations UK walked into the Green 
Park Underground station and saw a commotion at the end of the plat-
form. A man had fallen onto the tracks and was unable to help himself back 
up. Numerous people were debating what to do. The Parkour practitioner 
dropped his backpack, jumped onto the tracks, and lifted the man back up. 
His reaction was without thought about the practicalities of the procedure. 
As someone who tested his body’s capabilities and limits on a daily basis 
through Parkour, he knew he would be able to lift the man up, and how he 
would do it. In an e-mail to the authors, the rescuer said there “wasn’t any 
thought process” nor any doubt (Anonymous Hero, personal communica-
tion, March 22, 2016). 
With regard to specific evidence from the field of psychology. A few stud-
ies have found that the bystander effect is weaker, or does not occur, for 
people with domain specific training, or training to recognize the bystander 
effect itself (Fischer et al., 2011). Of our four proposed commonalities, this 
may be the area in need of the most scientific research. 
Habitual Helpers 
We argue that the final predictor of heroic behavior is repetitive action on 
behalf of others. These actions, often small-scale, serve as a building block 
of heroism insofar as they prime the prospective hero to take action when 
the need arises. It has been said the best predictor of future behavior is past 
behavior. While the pattern of helping in the development of heroes has not 
been examined in depth, there are quite a few studies that find many heroes 
are people who are habitual helpers. In fact, many studies of heroes find 
participants through organizations that award long-term commitment in 
providing prosocial service to others (see Becker & Eagly, 2004; Walker et 
al., 2010; Walker & Frimer, 2007). We see more direct evidence of habitual 
helping leading to more helping behavior in the research on prosocial de-
velopment. Participation in prosocial activities seems to foster prosocial be-
havior later in life (Eisenberg et al., 2006). Like the foot in the door, small 
commitments early in life lead to larger future commitments. One example 
is organized youth activities and nonvoluntary service in school programs 
is linked to future volunteering (Eisenberg et al., 2006). These prosocial 
habits also increase empathy, social responsibility, adoption of prosocial 
norms, opportunities to learn about new systems of meaning (e.g., about 
social injustice or society), and may also lead to changes in self-concept 
so habitual helpers begin to see themselves as helpful people (Eisenberg 
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et al., 2006). Here again, Oscar Romero is an example of a hero who lived 
his life in help to others. He made smaller commitments early in life such 
as attending seminary, which deepened his purpose, and opened routes to 
future prosocial behavior and heroism (Bronk & Riches, 2016). Interest-
ingly, just as it did with Oscar Romero, this habitual helping may serve as 
domain specific training. 
Furthermore, along with values, social comparison, commitments, and 
many other processes, these small habitual behaviors can help build a per-
son’s identity. As a comparison, people with a moral identity developed 
it, in part, by engaging in small acts of habitual helping through their life 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002; Walker & Frimer, 2007). People who have developed 
a moral identity see themselves as centrally a moral being; being moral and 
having moral values, principles and perspectives are central to their sense 
of self (Berkowitz, 1997). This moral identity is partially created because 
of habitual helping, and leads to further habitual helping as people with a 
moral identity act in accordance with that identity across contexts (Hardy 
& Carlo, 2011). While we do not expect all heroes to have a moral identity, 
we hypothesize that many will, and many more will have gone through sim-
ilar processes of incorporating their habitual helping in the development of 
their identity as a potential hero. 
Next Steps/Future Research 
While heroism research is growing (see Allison, Goethals, & Kramer, 2016), 
we lack understanding of how heroes develop. Leading developmental the-
ories, such as relational developmental systems theory, suggest human de-
velopment happens as a bidirectional interaction between individuals and 
multiple contexts (Ford & Lerner, 1992; Lerner, 1991, 2006). Studies using 
the developmental systems model are often person-centered and focus on 
the processes that create change in the person and their contexts (Lerner, 
1991, 2006). The four commonalities of hero development we have begun 
to outline in this article easily fit this developmental framework. 
Hero development may be similar to many moral exemplars: parent, 
mentor, and peer examples helping foster empathy, prosocial behavior, al-
truism, and moral identity. Heroes may have developed skills or traits spe-
cific to their heroic actions. Heroes may have a habit of small-scale helping 
that makes heroic action easier. Heroes may have developed a heroic imag-
ination, imagining and considering how they would act in situations call-
ing for heroism. Heroes may also have acted out of empathy due to direct 
commonality or identification with victims. Heroes may develop this way, 
but as yet we do not have much empirical data regarding the development 
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of heroes beyond the anecdotal. We propose the field of heroism science ex-
amine the development of heroes from the lens of the developmental sys-
tems model. 
It is not an easy task to study heroes and it will not be an easy task to 
examine these four commonalities; however, we propose a few next steps 
for this research. In-depth interviews with recognized heroes could help 
jump start the process of understanding hero development, as would us-
ing any available archival data of awarded heroes to examine evidence of 
these commonalities or suggest new ones. The field might also find use of 
a scale of heroism or intended heroic behavior. At present, survey mea-
sures of civil courage or various personality assessments are all that are 
available. 
Conclusion 
When confronted with a situation in which decisive, heroic behavior is re-
quired, most people do not act. What sort of person chooses to endanger 
herself on behalf of another person, perhaps a stranger? What motivates 
the hero to act when we know that so many others remain passive, bystand-
ers? Getting to the root of heroic motivation, understanding why the hero 
acts, why he is different from the crowd that stands back from the edge of 
the subway platform, has the potential for great benefit for our society. In 
considering four distinctions that characterize the hero, that separate him 
or her from everyone else, we also point to ways in which everyone might 
prepare themselves for a situation that calls for heroic action. This is in line 
with a goal of humanistic psychology which has always “sought pathways 
and technologies that assist human in reaching full humanness” (Moss, 
2014, p. 3). While we argue that heroism is, in some very real sense, pre-
determined by a series of choices made long before the heroic action takes 
place, we must point out that each of these characteristics can be inculcated 
in any prospective hero. Heroism, in this way, relies on or requires a great 
deal of priming or training. But it nonetheless remains something that is 
accessible to anyone who is willing and able to prepare for it. 
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Notes 
1.  Consider how much of the ongoing debate in the United States over gun vio-
lence, gun control, and so-called gun-free zones centers on the notion, proposed 
by gun owners and advocates, that, so long as he is not prohibited by local or-
dinances or federal regulation, a “good guy with a gun” will always step up he-
roically to protect the endangered masses against an active shooter. 
2.  Singer (1972), of course, proceeds from this example to argue for a more ex-
pansive understanding of need and assistance: “It makes no difference whether 
the person I can help is a neighbor’s child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose 
name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away” (pp. 231-232). 
3.  A powerful example from the world of professional athletics is Joe Delaney, a 
Pro Bowl running back with the Kansas City Chiefs, who attempted to rescue 
three drowning boys in a Monroe, Louisiana park on June 29, 1983. Though he 
had never learned to swim, Delaney succeeded in saving one of the boys before 
drowning in an attempt to save the two others. He was posthumously awarded 
the Presidential Citizens Medal by Ronald Reagan (cf. Reilly, 2003). 
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